

An opinionated review of RPKI validators and the state of their Debian packaging

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- 1 A very short introduction to RPKI
- 2 A review of RPKI validators
- 3 The state of RPKI software in Debian

What is RPKI?

RPKI is the system used to cryptographically validate BGP announcements.

The data components of RPKI:

- Route Origin Authorizations (ROA): the certificates stating which ASN is authorized to announce certain IP networks. A bit like RPSL route objects.
- Autonomous System Provider Authorizations (ASPA): the certificates stating which upstreams are authorized for an ASN.

The software components of RPKI:

- Publishing infrastructure by RIRs and networks.
- Validation infrastructure by each network.

Networks use RPKI to verify that the routes received from BGP peers, transits and customers are not spoofed.

BGP routers check if the state of a route is valid, invalid or unknown.

The software used by ISPs:

- Validators: collect the ROAs and ASPAs and verifies them.
- RPKI-to-Router (RTR) servers: make the result of validation available to the routers.

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The software (1)

Validators

- Routinator 3000
- OpenBSD's rpki-client
- ~~RIPE NCC RPKI Validator~~ (discontinued)
- ~~OctoRPKI~~ (discontinued)
- FORT Validator (development restarted in mid-2023)
- rpki-prover (niche software)
- ~~Dragon Research Labs RPKI toolkit~~ (not developed since 2018)

The software (2)

OctoRPKI and rpki-client do not implement the RPKI-to-router (RTR) protocol themselves, but use an external daemon.

RTR servers

- gortr (abandoned)
- stayrtr

stayrtr is an actively maintained fork of gortr and has replaced it.

Usage of validation software

| | Oct 2021 | May 2022 | Apr 2023 | Nov 2023 | Dec 2024 |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Routinator | 79% | 69.9% | 78.9% | 79.2% | 79.5% |
| rpki-client | 8% | 19.3% | 9.3% | 10.4% | 10.1% |
| OctoRPKI | 6% | 3.5% | 6.1% | 4.5% | 4.4% |
| FORT Validator | 3% | 3.2% | 4.2% | 3.9% | 3.8% |
| RIPE NCC Validator | 4% | 4.4% | 1.3% | 1.9% | 1.9% |
| rpki-prover | 0% | 0.5% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% |

This is dangerously close to becoming a *software monoculture*.

This data was gathered by NLNet Labs by counting the unique IPs accessing a RRDP web server.

Routinator

Pros

- Actively developed, support contracts available.
- Well documented.

Cons

- Difficult to package by distributions.
- Too high adoption causes a lack of software diversity.

Developed in Rust by NLnet Labs.

Pros

- Actively developed by network operators, support contracts available.
- Simple and essential.
- Separation of privileges in multiple processes.
- Quickly implements new protocol features.

Cons

- Needs a third party RTR daemon.

Developed in C by the OpenBSD project.

RIPE NCC Validator

Pros

- Nothing else was available at the time?

Cons

- Written in Java.
- RIPE NCC stopped development.
- End of support in June 2021: **nobody should use it anymore!**

Developed in Java by RIPE NCC.

Pros

- Simple and essential.

Cons

- Feels like a Cloudflare-specific project, the development roadmap is unclear.
- Needs a third party RTR daemon.
- Officially discontinued in March 2024: **nobody should use it anymore!**

Developed in Go by Cloudflare.

Pros

- Used to be actively developed.
- Well documented.
- Good middle ground of features and complexity.

Cons

- After a long pause development resumed in mid-2023, but it is still slow.

Developed in C by LACNIC and NIC.MX.

Pros

- Software diversity is good.

Cons

- Niche programming language.
- **Very** low No adoption.

Developed in Haskell by Mikhail Puzanov.

Should I package it?

My suggestions

Use two of:

- Routinator
- FORT Validator (?)
- rpki-client + stayrtr

They are all good and have different tradeoffs.

Using software packaged by a Linux distribution significantly reduces the system administration effort and allows to adopt diverse implementations.

Software diversity is important and needs to be encouraged!

Features

| | BGPSec | ASPA | RSC | signed TALs |
|----------------|--------|------|-----|----------------|
| Routinator | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| rpki-client | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| FORT Validator | | | | |
| rpki-prover | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |

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Why use packaged software

The great debate: packages from distributions¹ or the developers?

Why use distribution packages?

- Integration with the OS and high attention to details.
- Ready to use after the installation.
- Automatic security updates².
- Maintained by system administrators, not software developers.

Why use vendor packages?

- Freshness.

¹Full disclosure: I develop a Linux distribution (Debian).

²Job Snijders estimated in 2022 that over 70% of the clients currently in use are insecure.

Debian for network operators

Debian GNU/Linux is the one stop shop for all your RPKI validation needs.

My goals

- Packages with sane defaults which just work after being installed.
- Common management of TALs in the `rpki-trust-anchors` package.
- State of the art security with systemd sandboxing.

Issues

- The RPKI ecosystem is still young and fast-moving for a stable distribution.
- Routinator cannot be packaged (yet?).

The issue with Routinator

The Rust development ecosystem is broken and hostile to distributions

- APIs are not stable (and there is no dynamic linking).
- Hence it is common for Rust software to depend on specific versions of libraries.
- General *vendoring* of dependencies is not acceptable to the Debian security team.
- Maintaining multiple versions of libraries in the distribution is too much time consuming (and not appreciated either...).
- Different Rust programs depend on different versions of the same library.
- **Packaging complex Rust projects is difficult.**

The Routinator developers publish a Debian package which is good enough, but it does not use `rpki-trust-anchors`.

The state of Debian RPKI packages

| Package | Debian 11 | Debian 12 |
|---------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| <code>routinator</code> | X | X |
| <code>rpki-client</code> | X | (✓) |
| <code>oetorpki</code> | X | X |
| <code>fort-validator</code> | (✓) | (✓) |
| <code>gortr</code> | ✓ | ✓ |
| <code>stayrtr</code> | (✓) | (✓) |
| <code>rpki-trust-anchors</code> | ✓ | ✓ |
| OpenBGPD (bonus!) | X | (✓) |

I removed `gortr` from Debian 12, in favour of `stayrtr`.

All packages in Ubuntu 22.04 LTS are not up to date at this point and I do not recommend to use them for RPKI validation.

At this point I will not further update Debian 11.

Backports to Debian/stable

Backported packages of RPKI-related software and OpenBGPD will be maintained in the official Debian backports archive at least until the release of Debian 13.

```
echo 'deb http://deb.debian.org/debian bookworm-backports main' \  
> /etc/apt/sources.list.d/bookworm-backports.list  
apt update  
apt install rpki-client/bookworm-backports stayrtr/bookworm-backports
```

I will do the same for Debian 13 after it will be released.

Any questions?



<https://www.linux.it/~md/text/rpki-validators-anix2024.pdf>
(Google ... Marco d'Itri ... I'm feeling lucky)

